•Gellman Barton: Annan Suspicious of UNSCOM Role: U.N. Official Believes Evidence Shows Inspectors Helped U.S. Eavesdrop on Iraq." Washington Post, 6 Jan. 1999, A1. "Did the UNSCOM Inspectors Eavesdrop?" Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 11 Jan. 1999, 15.

"U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has obtained what he regards as convincing evidence that United Nations arms inspectors helped collect eavesdropping intelligence used in American efforts to undermine the Iraqi regime."

[GenPostwar/1990s/UN-Iraq][c]

•Gellman, Barton. "Before Sept. 11, Unshared Clues and Unshaped Policy." Washington Post, 17 May 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"On July 5 of last year,... the White House summoned officials of a dozen federal agencies to the Situation Room. 'Something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it's going to happen soon,' the government's top counterterrorism official,
Richard Clarke, told the assembled group, according to two of those present." The group included the FAA, along with the Coast Guard, FBI, Secret Service and INS.

"Clarke directed every counterterrorist office to cancel vacations, defer nonvital travel, put off scheduled exercises and place domestic rapid-response teams on much shorter alert. For six weeks last summer, at home and overseas, the U.S. government was at its highest possible state of readiness -- and anxiety -- against imminent terrorist attack....

"As late as July 31, the FAA urged U.S. airlines to maintain a 'high degree of alertness.' All those alert levels dropped by the time hijackers armed with box cutters took control of four jetliners on the morning of Sept. 11."

[Terrprism/2002/WTC]

•Gellman, Barton. [Series of two articles]

1. "Broad Effort Launched After '98 Attacks." Washington Post, 19 Dec. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

First of two articles.

"Beginning on Aug. 7, 1998, the day that al Qaeda destroyed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, [U.S. President Bill] Clinton directed a campaign of increasing scope and lethality against [Osama] bin Laden's network that carried through his final days in office.

"In addition to a secret 'finding' to authorize covert action,... Clinton signed three highly classified Memoranda of Notification expanding the available tools. In succession, the president authorized killing instead of capturing bin Laden, then added several of al Qaeda's senior lieutenants, and finally approved the shooting down of private civilian aircraft on which they flew.

"The Clinton administration ordered the Navy to maintain two Los Angeles-class attack submarines on permanent station in the nearest available waters, enabling the U.S. military to place Tomahawk cruise missiles on any target in Afghanistan within about six hours of receiving the order....

"The lines Clinton opted not to cross continued to define U.S. policy in his successor's first eight months. Clinton stopped short of using more decisive military instruments, including U.S. ground forces, and declined to expand the reach of the war to the Taliban regime that hosted bin Laden and his fighters after 1996."

2. "Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign." Washington Post, 20 Dec. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Second of two articles.

"By any measure available, Clinton left office having given greater priority to terrorism than any president before him. His government doubled counterterrorist spending across 40 departments and agencies.... Clinton devoted some of his highest-profile foreign policy speeches to terrorism, including two at the U.N. General Assembly. An interagency panel, the Counterterrorism Strategy Group, took on new weight in policy disputes.... And the foreign policy cabinet, by the time it left office, had been convening every two to three weeks to shape a covert and overt campaign against al Qaeda.

"But neither Clinton nor his administration treated terrorism as their top concern, because it was not. Without the overriding impetus provided by Sept. 11, the war on terror in the 1990s lost as many struggles inside government as it won. Steps to manage risk moved forward readily. Some of the harder initiatives, hurried through these past three months by President Bush, foundered then on money, bureaucratic turf, domestic politics and rival conceptions of national interest."

[Terrorism/2001]

•Gellman, Barton. "CIA Weighs 'Targeted Killing' Missions." Washington Post, 28 Oct. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Armed with new authority from President Bush for a global campaign against al Qaeda, the Central Intelligence Agency is contemplating clandestine missions expressly aimed at killing specified individuals."

[CIA/2000s/2001; Terrorism/2001/WRC]

•Gellman, Barton. "The Fallout from a Botched Assassination Try." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 13 Oct. 1997, 14-15.

The failed Israeli effort on 25 September 1997 to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Meshal in Amman "threatens the already shaky hopes for peace in the region." Gellman reviews both the known operational details of the Israeli operation and its immediate repercussions.

[Israel][c]

• Gellman, Barton. "Remember, You Didn't Read It Here." Washington Post, 19 Sep. 1992, A4.

Reports announcement of NRO's declassification.

[NRO]

• Gellman, Barton. "Senior Israeli Officials Strongly Deny Reports of `Mole' in U.S. Government." Washington Post, 8 May 1997, A20.

[Israel/Israeli-U.S. Relations/"Mega"]

•Gellman, Barton. "Sudan's Offer to Arrest Militant Fell Through After Saudis Said No." Washington Post, 3 Oct. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The government of Sudan, employing a back channel direct from its president to the Central Intelligence Agency, offered in the early spring of 1996 to arrest Osama bin Laden and place him in Saudi custody, according to officials and former officials in all three countries.... Unable to persuade the Saudis to accept bin Laden, and lacking a case to indict him in U.S. courts at the time, the Clinton administration finally gave up on the capture."

[Terrorism/2001]

•Gellman, Barton. "U.S. Spied on Iraqi Military Via U.N." Washington Post, 2 Mar. 1999, A1. "There's Information-Gathering and There's Spying." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 8 Mar, 1999, 16-17.

"United States intelligence services infiltrated agents and espionage equipment for three years into United Nations arms control teams in Iraq to eavesdrop on the Iraqi military without the knowledge of the U.N. agency that it used to disguise its work, according to U.S. government employees and documents describing the classified operation."

[GenPostwar/1990s/UN-Iraq]

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Published on: 2002-09-24 (2246 reads)